Fudge is alerting us to? What does she mean by the history of animals appearing as only aspects of human history, and how does it relate to the historians ethical responsibility in the present? How are we to write animals in historical work?
The calls for radical historicizing propose reflexivity in our studies involving animals; that is, to reflect on how we engage (or fail to engage) with animals in the histories we write and how we engage with them in relation to, situated in and as part of ongoing debates and controversies involving animals. This is not only important because of disciplinary reflexivity but also, Fudge argues, because "the history of animals is a necessary part of our reconceptualization of ourselves as humans " (2002: 5) . In this way she invites a shift from human-focused histories to histories where animals are placed next to humans. Radical historicizing thus involves a commitment to reformulate methodological assumptions and implications for how non-humans are or should be included in our studies. Such methodological concerns on historical writing have been presented and deliberated in the fields of STS and history of science represented (in addition to Fudge) particularly by Asdal (2011), Haraway (1989) and Latour (2005) . Even though all of these scholars, including Fudge, are concerned with constructions and materiality and how representations are inherently linked to materiality, the latter three mobilize a somewhat different version of radical historicizing which involves specific methodological commitments on how we are to widen the scope of who gets to be enacted as part of our stories and in what ways.
In this article I seek to build on Fudge's call for radical historicizing, but place her arguments in dialogue with methodological assumptions developed in the fields of STS and history of science. I will do so by discussing methodological and theoretical strategies in my own work where I have traced the development and establishment of a laboratory animal science industry in Norway in the period 1950s to the 1980s. Further, I will highlight and discuss work I have drawn upon and been inspired by to reflect on the methodological resources offered by STS and history of science for doing radical historicizing.
Thus, the article presents a reflexive review of current methods and perspectives in the social sciences and humanities that have affected my engagement with the history of laboratory animals. It presents an argument for doing historiography that reflects contemporary scholarly concerns on representation: Rather than seeking to "give animals histories of their own" I propose that radical historicizing should include writing histories of the entanglement and disentanglement of humans and other things and beings. This does not then involve a shift to writing animal stories for the sake of animals, but to write stories where humans and animals are considered mutually shaped and affected by each other, and how these interactions have world-transforming effects.
"Animal histories" -wanted utopia or not?
Animal histories have often been deemed impossible as they fail to include the two fundamental ingredients of history: text and temporality. Animals do not leave documents that capture their histories and they do not have a sense of time as we humans have.
Rather, they have tended to be "used" in historical accounts to show something particular about human practices and worlds and as such made into powerful symbols (with an emphasis on symbol rather than "real"). In reality then the history of animals has been the history of human attitudes towards animals (Fudge 2002: 5) .
Fudge identifies the problem of animal histories as linked to the discussions within history between empiricism and post-structuralism where the former believe that the past is recoverable to history through an objective analysis of its documents, while the latter sees history as constructed. The difference affects how historians can know and understand the past (2002: 6) . This is a very important point and is as I see it at the heart of disciplinary debates on the subject of history in general: How to reconstruct the past that fits reality the best. For instance, the distinction presented by Fudge sounds familiar when thinking of the debates on the relationship between STS and history of science foregrounded by Lorraine Daston (2009 ), Sheila Jasanoff (2000 and Peter Dear & Sheila Jasanoff (2010) .
The history of science have been more in line with the empiricist approach in that they have been concerned with understanding science on its own terms, in specific historical moments, by attending to its practices. STS on the other hand follows the constructivist approach (or we better call it a post-constructivist approach as it should not be mistaken with social constructivism, see Asdal 2003 Social (2005: 9) when "knitting" the history together from blueprints, notes, White papers, letters, books, pamphlets, reports, bulletins, newsletters, academic publications, comic strips, photographies and so forth. Latour reminds us in his (re-)introduction to ANT that it was never meant to be a theoretical model and those who relate to it as such have a tendency to misunderstand the real potential of ANT; ANT is an empirical method: "...the historical name is 'actor-network-theory', a name that is so awkward, so confusing, so meaningless that it deserves to be kept... I was ready to drop this label for more elaborate ones...until someone pointed out to me that the acronym A.N.T. was perfectly fit for a blind, myopic, workaholic, trail-sniffing, and collective traveler. An ant writing for other ants" (p. 9). Knitting "my" story together involved a constant tracing of connections between people, things and animals.
Sometimes the animals could be present in the texts even though they were not mentioned or easily identified. were produced for use in routine science came to be known as specific pathogen free animals (SPF), which was a term that specified its standard of health and value as laboratory animal.
To investigate the transformation of laboratory animals in these processes I based the analysis on insights from STS (including actor-network-theory) and history of science, in particular Bruno Latour (1996) and Adele Clarke (1987) . I start the story by investigating how laboratory animals became established as crucial tools
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Writing radical laboratory animal histories 40 for science and how the scientists worked towards establishing a laboratory animal science industry, in particular the building of a large-scale production unit for standardized laboratory animals.
Latour's book Aramis, or the love of technology (1996) has been particularly helpful in conceptualizing how a technological project develops (or fail to develop) from vision to reality and the negotiations and challenges involved in realizing new technoscientific objects. Together with Clarke's work that emphasizes the importance of attending to not only the objects of science, but also their infrastructural arrangements, Latour's work and other STS studies have brought the technology to life in the study in terms of recognizing its importance for the realization of scientific knowledge production in the first place. The concept of infrastructural arrangements includes not only the architectonic aspects of science (such as the lab or the animal house), but the research materials, theories, methods, instruments and so on. All of these aspects are part of the infrastructural arrangements of producing science and they are interlinked in complex ways. Even the laboratory animal is part of the infrastructural arrangements (see also Fujimura 1996) , exemplified by the significance of maintaining SPF standards, in a way that they were at the same time intrinsically constitutive of the infrastructure and strangely hidden by being one element among a myriad of necessary tools, people and machines.
The role of infrastructures and practices of care in laboratory animal science
The Norwegian scientists had already in the early 1950s recognized that a central part of performing disease control was to have proper infrastructures for housing and care for the animals.
Housing and using SPF and other specifically defined animals, the control of hygiene became intrinsic to the practices of the animal house. The animal house came to be regarded as an extended part of the laboratory. A constant tinkering was going on to adjust the technological and human infrastructures to the maintenance of the animal's health and quality as laboratory animals. By attending to how infrastructures were built and practices of care developed and organized inside of or integral to these infrastructures, I was able to trace how the animal was transformed and how it was both an effect of and affected the practices of laboratory animal science. I argue in line with Haraway (2008) that in constructing a standardized laboratory animal science practice, the animal was made into a co-worker; laboratory animals became working animals that needed attention and caring and the animal technicians needed thus to know the individual animals.
Even though the housing and use of animals were highly regulated in terms of hygienic concerns and reliable scientific knowledge production, these instrumental relations should not be seen as reductionist in the conventional meaning of the word (e.g. Haraway
2008, Fox Keller 1983).
Relating to the animal as technology in the laboratory can actually mean the exact opposite of this: The animal as technology is more valued in this particular setting than the animal that is not. Tresselt I argue that the animals were constituted as both technologies and natural beings, and that these aspects were intrinsically linked. Even though I wasn't able to observe animal technicians using, handling, and caring for the animals in real-time, I was able to trace how care practices were organized in the animal house and how different forms of care and welfare concerns became part of the scientific practices of experimenting on animals.
For my work the feminist perspectives has drawn attention to the links between organizing bodies and relations and scientific standards and politics of health. They have activated my way of engaging with the material; my way of reading and interpreting the story.
It allowed me both to conceptualize and describe the practices of the animal house but also to be attentive to the importance of care as part of the work of standardizing laboratory animal science in the first place and how these mundane practices of science were both innovative and constitutive of public health work.
Paying attention to the texts available to trace these connections were also valuable clues to the status and role of animal technicians and laboratory animals. Even though expertise on husbandry and care practices came to be highly valued in the system of public health science, the animal technicians are as silent in the texts as the animals. Their silence, that is, their absence, in the texts as narrators that make insight in the practices of the animal house possible for the historian, makes for speculative historicizing in many respects. However, as feminist scholars and historians alike have shown, considering the importance of what is not present has an analytical value in itself; it can be indications of the low status of animals and animal technicians in science compared to scientists even though their importance were proved and argued for again and again. This further emphasizes the multiplicity and tension that embodied the standardized laboratory animal.
A combined attentiveness to how work in the animal house was organized and the texts available to reconstruct the negotiations and strategies for doing so, proves to be fruitful to understanding how animals were transformed into compound standards for public health science (as well as in relation to the public concerns on animal welfare, see below). Further, looking at the practices of care and organizing life invites insights to how different welfare concerns developed. Failing to pay attention to such other alternative and perhaps more promising realities, leaves them, as Ingunn Moser has argued, "unrecognized, and so become disarticulated and made absent, and in consequence, become weaker and less real" (2011: 707-708) . By combining the ANT approach of trail-sniffing with perspectives from feminist technoscience on how practices of care and tinkering have world-transforming effects, these mundane practices of science became visible and significant. The fruitfulness of attending to mundane practices was particularly evident when investigating the emergence of laboratory animal science as the concerns that presented themselves in care practices could be traced all the way from the infrastructural and practical aspects of housing, the quality and morals of science and society, and the politics of public health; thus, linking humans and animals together in multiple, intricate and experimental ways.
Understanding the controversy of laboratory animals in science and society
In writing the history of laboratory animals in Norway it was thus necessary to do a double tracing: One of the material practices of the animal house and the laboratory, and the other on how the technoscientific spaces of science were envisioned, built, and organized for public health. Following the animal and how it was organized and made sense of in these different modes of ordering, led me to conclude that the animals were in fact constituted as compound welfare standards as their composition and use depended on multiple forms of care and welfare concerns; animal welfare, public health and welfare, and reliable scientific knowledge production. The materiality of the animal -that is, the genetic and pathogenic composition representing a particular standard of health -became intrinsically linked to the standard of health in the general public and the standard of Norwegian science. To establish a link between human and animal welfare was crucial also in terms of legitimizing the practice in the general public.
Animal experimentation has always been a contested practice, and has regularly been subject to controversies between scientists and parts of the public. By asserting that laboratory animal science was a practice intensely concerned with both human and animal welfare and was driven by scientific expertise and technoscientific infrastructures, scientists were during the 1960s able to constitute the practice as a fundamentally welfare-oriented endeavor. Despite this rhetoric, critical outcries to the use of animals in experiments escalated during the 1970s in Europe and the US, and ideas of animals having rights were put forward as strategies for protecting animals against being inflicted unnecessary pain. In Norway animal rightists challenged the emerging practice by accusing scientists to be driven by a pure logic of the mind rather than a more sympathetic "logic of the heart". Fostering sentiments that were only linked to the rational mind were dangerous and challenged people's abilities to care for not only other than humans but also fellow humans, the rightists claimed. The issue of animal welfare and rights were according to the critics of animal experimentation a matter of concern in line with discrimination based on race, poverty, and gender. The scientists responded by pointing to the successes of animal-based science as well as the expertise and infrastructures of science, and how important animal-based science was for ensuring prosperity and health. In this view, and by law, the animal's pain did not 42 outweigh the gain as long as the pain could be alleviated or controlled by skilled care and husbandry practices.
Rather than understanding the conflict as stalemate in a non-productive way, I have argued that the science-public interaction on the issue of laboratory animals have (re-)enforced the rational combination of welfare and economy proposed by the scientists. As the scientists could point to a powerful materiality, the animal rightists could not provide technoscientific solutions to the challenges of public health, and thus were deemed to propose unpromising and unviable futures (Druglitrø 2013 
Radical historicizing as attentive historicizing
To conclude I want to pick up on where I opened this essay, by attending to the call for radical historicizing. I agree with Fudge that there is a need for radical historicizing in terms of including animals and nature in our studies of the social, and to be explicit about it. The history of animals is not merely a trend in the ever-widening reach of historical scholarship; it is much more than that. It is a development of existing debates in the discipline and the social and humanist sciences as well as in human relationships to nature, emphasizing the situatedness of both author and subject matters (Fudge 2002: 5) . Even though radical historicizing seems somewhat different from an ANT perspective than from a cultural historian's perspective as proposed by Fudge, the difference should not be overemphasized.
Fudge's point about radical historicizing is descriptive of what I have tried to do in my work. That is, to bring an engagement from the present into historical events and issues. A historian has as its job not only to "recapture" the past, but to mobilize the past in order to have impact on issues of the present, for instance such as the massive scale on the use of animals today in science and food production. However, Fudge claims that this could only be done at the expense of the human, by placing the human "next to the animals, rather than as the users of the animals" (p. 15). Radical historicizing from an ANT point of view would be to start from a symmetrical standpoint, as also Fudge proposes, but not at the expense of the human; to write radical histories would not be at the expense of anything (so to speak), as it would be concerned with assembling the matters of concern and materialities in a particular historically situated practice, and trace how these assemblages produce particular contexts or realities. The question of "who is empowered to act, and who is not?» is a better description of the starting point for a historical analysis mobilized by ANT resources (Harbers 2005: 14 
